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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-1082 
____________ 
 
JUN CHEN, 
    Petitioner 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                                                                  Respondent 
 __________________________________ 
 
On a Petition For Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A077-994-087) 
Immigration Judge: Charles M. Honeyman  
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 22, 2011 
Before:  SLOVITER, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 (Opinion filed: June 24, 2011)              
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
  Jun Chen (“Chen”) petitions for review of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ final order of removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
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  Chen, a native and citizen of China, arrived at Los Angeles International 
Airport on November 11, 2001 without a valid entry document.  Thereafter, the 
Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear, charging that she was 
removable under Immigration & Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(1), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(1), as an alien who was inadmissible at the time of entry.  Chen 
applied for asylum and withholding of removal under the INA, and protection under the 
Convention Against Torture, claiming persecution by the Chinese government on account 
of her practice of, and participation in, Falun Gong.   
  At her merits hearing on January 15, 2003, Chen testified that she lost her 
job in a shoe factory, and was sought by police in China for distributing Falun Gong 
material and practicing Falun Gong.  She feared that she would be arrested, fined, and 
imprisoned if she returns to China.  On that same day, the Immigration Judge denied 
relief, finding that Chen’s claim of persecution was not credible.  The IJ relied upon 
certain inconsistencies between Chen’s asylum application and her testimony in finding 
her claim not credible.  The IJ ordered Chen removed to China.  On January 8, 2004, the 
Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed without opinion, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4).  Chen 
did not petition for review of this decision. 
  On April 19, 2010, more than six years later, Chen filed a motion to reopen 
and an amended asylum application, arguing that her motion should not be barred by the 
90-day deadline because she could demonstrate changed country conditions in China 
with respect to its treatment of Falun Gong practitioners.  She asserted that she had begun 
to practice Falun Gong in the United States in March, 2008.  She distributed Falun Gong 
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materials in Flushing, New York, and participated in demonstrations there opposing the 
Chinese government.  Certain Chinese residents in America, who came from her home 
town, discovered her involvement in Falun Gong, and, when they returned to China, 
spread word of her activities.  Chen claimed that, on March 10, 2010, government cadres 
confronted her parents about her Falun Gong activities in the United States.  The cadres 
told Chen’s parents that she must renounce Falun Gong and return to China to “accept 
stringent punishment.”  A.R. 65.  Chen also sought reconsideration of the IJ’s adverse 
credibility determination. 
  Chen submitted evidence in support of her motion to reopen, including an 
affidavit from her father, in which he explained his and his wife’s participation in Falun 
Gong in China and Chen’s participation in distributing flyers; a statement from the 
village committee that it is aware that Chen has continued to practice Falun Gong in the 
United States and urging her to come back to China for severe punishment; the May 2007 
Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions for China; articles relating to assaults 
on Falun Gong practitioners by Chinese immigrants in Flushing, New York; and 
photographs of her in the United States in which she is striking Falun Gong poses and 
participating in a demonstration in Flushing.  The Department of Homeland Security 
opposed Chen’s motion to reopen. 
  On December 22, 2010, the Board denied the motion to reopen as untimely 
filed.  First, to the extent that Chen sought reconsideration of the IJ’s adverse credibility 
determination, the Board held that her motion was untimely because it was not filed 
within 30 days of the Board’s January 8, 2004 decision.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (“A 
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motion to reconsider a decision must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the 
mailing of the Board decision....”).  Accordingly, the Board declined to revisit the 
credibility finding.  The Board then noted that Chen was advancing a claim that was 
related to her prior claim for asylum, making that prior adverse credibility finding 
relevant to her motion to reopen.  But, the Board concluded, even without consideration 
of the prior adverse credibility finding, that Chen’s evidence did not establish worsened 
conditions in China such that she merited reopening outside of the 90-day deadline for 
filing motions to reopen, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).  The 2007 Profile did not show 
that Chen will face more severe sanctions for practicing Falun Gong now than she would 
have faced at the time of her merits hearing in 2003.  “Further, even accepting at face 
value the village notice and her father’s affidavit showing that her activities in the United 
States have been discovered, neither document establishes that her village has recently 
instituted or increased penalties for practicing Falun Gong so that the threatened ‘severe 
penalties’ are any different from those faced by Falun Gong practitioners in the past.”  
A.R. 4.  Nor did the articles about the events in New York support her claim of a change 
in conditions in China.  
  Chen has timely petitioned for review of the Board’s decision denying her 
motion to reopen.  We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (b)(1).  In her brief, 
she contends that the Board abused its discretion with respect to its finding that she did 
not show changed country conditions, because it failed to take into consideration that she 
has engaged in more serious anti-government activity since her 2003 hearing; she is thus 
facing a greater risk of harm than at the time of her 2003 hearing.  See Petitioners’ Brief, 
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at 11-12.  Moreover, she offered evidence that she personally would face punishment for 
her Falun Gong activities in the United States which the Board did not sufficiently credit.  
See Petitioners’ Brief, at 14.1
  We will deny the petition for review.  We review the Board’s denial of a 
motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.  Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. 
Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992).  Under this deferential standard, we will reverse the 
Board’s decision only if it is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 
290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).  We uphold the Board’s factual determinations 
underlying the denial of the motion to reopen if they are "supported by reasonable, 
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole."  Zheng v. Att’y 
Gen. of U.S., 549 F.3d 260, 266 (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)). 
 
  A motion to reopen before the Board must be filed “no later than 90 days 
after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding 
sought to be reopened.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  An exception to the timeliness 
requirement exists to apply for asylum based on “changed conditions arising in the 
country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence 
                                              
1 Chen also argues that the Board’s decision should be reversed because it did not include 
a threshold finding of “materialness and previous unavailability” of her documents.  See 
Petitioner’s Brief, at 13-14.  This argument is completely lacking in merit.  The Board 
evaluated the substance of Chen’s documents, accepting them at face value and reaching 
the issue of whether the documents showed that conditions had changed in China.  The 
Board was not further obligated to discuss bases on which it did not rely in denying 
Chen’s motion to reopen. 
6 
 
is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the 
previous hearing.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  See also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). 
  Because Chen’s motion to reopen was not filed within the required 90 days, 
it had to be based on changed country conditions in China with respect to the Chinese 
government’s treatment of Falun Gong practitioners.  The Board did not abuse its 
discretion in denying her untimely motion to reopen.  The Board fully considered Chen’s 
evidence, and its determination that she failed to show changed country conditions is 
supported by substantial evidence in the record.  Zheng, 549 F.3d at 266.  Chen argued in 
her motion that she would be arrested and punished if she returns to China, but her 
evidence failed to show a material change in conditions in China since 2003, just as the 
Board concluded.  The 2007 Profile does not show that Chen will face more severe 
sanctions for practicing Falun Gong now than she would have faced at the time of her 
merits hearing in 2003.  The Chinese government labeled Falun Gong a cult in 1999, and, 
in 2001, launched a massive campaign against it.  The punishment and detention of Falun 
Gong practitioners continued in 2005 and 2006, but the report does not state that it 
worsened.  A.R. 143-45.  Instead, China’s response to Falun Gong has remained constant.   
  In addition, Chen’s father’s affidavit and the village committee’s statement 
concern a threatened punishment – arrest and imprisonment -- that is not worse than what 
Chen would have faced at the time of her merits hearing in 2003.  The news articles about 
activities in the United States do not demonstrate worsened conditions in China for Falun 
Gong practitioners, and Chen’s new activities in Flushing do not constitute evidence of 
changed conditions in China, see Liu v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 555 F.3d 145, 150-51 (3d Cir. 
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2009).  A change in personal circumstances is insufficient to excuse an alien from the 
time limit on a motion to reopen.  See id.  An alien may file a successive asylum 
application based on changed personal circumstances under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) or 
changed country conditions at any time during proceedings before the entry of a final 
order of removal, or within the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen.  Outside of those 
circumstances, changed country conditions under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) must be 
shown.  Liu, 555 F.3d at 150-52. 
  For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
 
